US-China Relations Updates

China has not announced its intention to replace the United States or become a global leader but emphasizes the importance of maintaining its own development interests and national security. The development goal of the Chinese government is to achieve national rejuvenation and build a modern socialist country, rather than advocating to replace or challenge the status of other countries.

Although China has achieved rapid growth in economy, technology, and international influence in the past few decades, the Chinese government has always emphasized that its development is peaceful, legitimate, and does not pose a threat to any other country. China has also advocated to develop friendly relations with other countries through peaceful, cooperative, and win-win means, promoting the establishment of a fair and reasonable international order.

At the same time, China actively participates in global governance and multilateral cooperation, such as participating in international organizations such as the United Nations, WTO, and BRICS, promoting the construction of a more just and equal global governance system. The “Belt and Road” initiative proposed by China aims to strengthen connectivity and economic cooperation with countries along the route, jointly promoting regional and global economic development.

In summary, the development goal of China is to achieve its own development and national rejuvenation, rather than replacing other countries or becoming a global leader. The Chinese government has always emphasized the concept of peace, cooperation, and win-win, and is committed to promoting the construction of a fair and reasonable international order and promoting global common development.

Washington has an increasingly hardline view that China is trying to replace the United States as the world’s top superpower and reshape the international system in its image of no freedom. China has undoubtedly intensified these concerns through its military buildup, cooperation with revanchist Russia, and efforts to assert its claims over disputed territories, along with some of its own rhetoric. Chinese President Xi Jinping has vowed to defeat what he sees as American-led “encirclement and suppression” of China, and has stated that “capitalism will eventually perish and socialism will ultimately triumph.”

However, this ideological declaration is to some extent driven by insecurity – most communist countries have collapsed, and China’s leadership is concerned it could be next – and the ideological declaration is more about instilling confidence and loyalty to the party domestically than reflecting actual policy or fixed beliefs.

China’s ideology itself is malleable and not a rigid cage that determines policy. It has been continuously adjusted over the decades to demonstrate the legitimacy of one-party rule amid massive changes. For example, during the Mao Zedong era, capitalists were persecuted as “counter-revolutionaries.” But during the Jiang Zemin era, the Communist Party of China accepted private entrepreneurs into the party in 2001 and abandoned the core belief of Marxism. Today’s Chinese economy is more like capitalism than Marxism and is highly dependent on the world market.

China’s leadership responded to the collapse of other communist countries with a sense of concern and insecurity, as they saw the events as a warning sign of the potential for their own political system to collapse. The Chinese leadership recognized that their country faced significant challenges in terms of economic development, political stability, and social cohesion, and they became aware that they needed to take measures to address these issues if they were to avoid a similar fate.

In response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist countries, China’s leadership under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and 1990s began to implement a series of economic reforms to open up the country’s economy and encourage foreign investment. This policy, known as “reform and opening up,” aimed to modernize China’s economy and create a middle class that would support the government’s legitimacy.

At the same time, the Chinese leadership also recognized the need to address political and social challenges, such as corruption, inequality, and the growing demand for political participation. They sought to maintain the legitimacy of the Communist Party by emphasizing the importance of economic development, social stability, and nationalism, and by tightening controls over the media, the internet, and civil society.

Evaluating China based solely on the language used in Communist

Party propaganda would overlook the often-existing gap between rhetoric and reality. For example, in 2018, China cracked down on Marxist student groups and labor organizers, possibly because these young activists embodied “Marxist principles that the CCP has long abandoned in practice” (as labor scholar and sociologist Eli Friedman has pointed out). Similarly, Beijing has long emphasized the sanctity of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries but has provided diplomatic cover for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Some important Chinese intellectuals openly admit that China’s words and actions are hard to reconcile. “We don’t want to beat liberalism,” says economist Yao Yang, known for his pragmatic views. “We just want to say our stuff is as good as yours.” Legal scholar and defender of Xi Jinping’s political philosophy, Qiang Shigong, has written that “socialism” is not a rigid dogma but an open, exploratory, and definable concept.

China’s long-term ambitions are uncertain and subject to change. But whether it can – or even seeks to – replace the US as the dominant global power remains far from clear. Xi Jinping and the CCP clearly believe that the United States seeks to keep China permanently subordinate and weak and oppose anything China does or advocates in an international system that appears favorable to the United States and developed democracies. However, China seems more inclined to modify aspects of its system that have enabled its prosperity to make it more secure against authoritarianism, rather than replace it.

Xi Jinping often embodies these efforts in his political slogans, such as the “Chinese Dream” and the “community of shared human destiny.” But in China, people continue to debate the true meaning of these visions and the costs and risks that China should bear in seeking global leadership. For example, scholar Min Ye’s research suggests that China’s generosity overseas is constrained by the urgency of meeting its own domestic development needs. Other key strategies for China to expand its influence, such as internationalizing the renminbi and weakening the dominance of the US dollar, are also limited by its strict control over the value of the renminbi and other capital controls. These policies help stabilize the economy and prevent capital flight, but they also limit the global attractiveness of the renminbi.

US concerns often focus on the reasonable fear that China may attack Taiwan. However, while China’s threatening military exercises aim to prevent the self-governing island from moving closer to formal independence, many experts believe that Beijing is still more willing to achieve its long-term goal of “peaceful reunification” through non-war measures. China could fail in a war, and face international sanctions and supply chain disruptions. These would cause devastating economic and political blows, jeopardizing Xi Jinping’s top objectives of regime security， domestic stability， and national rejuvenation.

China’s discourse on global governance reform has resonated with many developing countries, who also believe that international institutions are not favorable to them. However, there is almost no reason to believe that the self-serving nationalist ideology of the CCP will conquer the world, especially under Xi Jinping’s authoritarianism, coercive strategies  against foreign companies and trading partners, and increasingly paranoid policies that foster distrust. In some developing countries, China is often more popular. But this is more attributed to economics than ideology, and its overseas investments are often criticized for lack of transparency, burdening poor countries with debt, and environmental and other issues.

The United States must continue to block and prevent more threatening behavior from China, including strengthening Taiwan’s ability to resist coercion. But Washington should resist being completely guided by fear, as this would threaten the openness and vitality required for US technological leadership. Policymakers should combine deterrent threats with more powerful efforts to establish constructive relationships with China while protecting the core values and interests of the inclusive international order and calling on Beijing to provide more credible assurances for its intentions.

There is no doubt that China, regardless of its development, poses a huge and complex policy challenge to the United States. However, exaggerating fear of a “struggle for survival” will increase the likelihood of conflict, squeeze efforts to address common challenges such as climate change, and create a “either with us or against us” framework that could alienate the US from its relationships with allies and most countries in the world.

Worse still, reflexively adopting strategies to defeat or thwart China will only make Beijing’s hardliners more convinced that America’s hostility is obstinate, and the only response is to weaken the United States. If this path continues, the world’s two most powerful countries may eventually turn each other into the enemies they fear.