US-China Relations Updates

The Wall Street Journal reported on May 29th that China had rejected the US invitation for a bilateral meeting on defense in Singapore in May, according to a statement from the US Department of Defense. If this is true, it is highly likely that US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will not meet with his Chinese counterpart, Li Shangfu, at the Shangri-La Dialogue from June 2nd to 4th, which appears to contradict President Biden’s prediction at the G7 summit that China and the US will “start to thaw soon”.

The biggest concern about the meeting between Li Shangfu and Austin, who just took office in March, is the US sanctions on Li during the Trump administration due to the purchase of Russian weapons. Although the US claims that the sanctions do not prevent the meeting between Li and Austin, Chinese sources have reportedly told the US that the chance of a meeting between the two is slim unless the sanctions are lifted.

Biden said at the G7 summit that he would discuss lifting the sanctions on Li Shangfu, but there are already voices in the Washington diplomatic community questioning whether Biden is softening his stance on China. The US State Department has also quickly clarified that “we have no plans to lift sanctions against (Li Shangfu), or to lift them against China more broadly.”

Similarly, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who canceled his visit to China in February due to the balloon incident between China and the US, has not had the opportunity to reschedule his visit. Although Biden deliberately described the balloon incident as “silly” at the G7 summit, clearly indicating his intention to downplay tensions between China and the US, a British media report earlier stated that China was concerned that the FBI investigation report on the defeated Chinese balloon would be released during Blinken’s visit to China. Therefore, the date of Blinken’s visit could not be reconfirmed until Biden’s handling of the report was determined.

If the above news is true, it seems that China-US relations have reached a point where they can no longer bear even a symbolic negative factor. Some US officials even claim that China has refused to meet with senior US officials more than ten times since 2021.

However, this does not mean that China’s foreign policy towards the US is not pragmatic.

On the one hand, these messages of China refusing to meet have always been from US officials, which is obviously part of the public relations propaganda war, creating the impression that China is the “unfriendly” party to the majority of the “non-aligned” countries in the world. But objectively speaking, when the Biden administration launched wave after wave of sanctions against China, even directly targeting all Chinese companies without asking for reasons, as in the semiconductor ban last October, people could see why China was reluctant to talk.

On the other hand, China has already resumed communication with the US at every level where there is no symbolic negative factor and there is a necessity. On May 8th, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with US Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns in Beijing. On May 10th and 11th, Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, had a dialogue with White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in Vienna for more than eight hours, and relevant information was only released afterward. On May 25th, China’s newly appointed ambassador to the US, Xie Feng, met with Victoria Nuland, the US Deputy Secretary of State, to explore “the correct way for China and the US to coexist in the new era”. On May 25th and 26th, Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao also met with US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and Trade Representative Katherine Tai during the APEC Trade Ministers’ Meeting in the US.

These meetings, including diplomatic department contacts, frank strategic dialogues between high-level officials of China and the US, and economic and trade sector communication, are all included and can be considered the high point of China-US contact this year.

The military gap is actually not difficult to understand. China’s sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as its increasing military support, are very clear, and the US has expanded the number of military bases available in the Philippines and signed defense cooperation agreements with Papua New Guinea this year, which is obviously to prepare for the possibility of military action against Taiwan and to strengthen military containment of China. Everyone is taking a “strategic clarity” approach, and military communication can only try to establish channels to avoid potential conflicts, and will not bring any strategic changes. At this moment, China and the US are not yet at the point of armed conflict.

Biden’s foreign policy towards China is a selective policy from the beginning. From the three-part policy of “competition, cooperation, and confrontation” to the so-called “walled garden” technology sanctions, to building a “fence” for China-US relations, these are all different metaphors for selective choicesThe Wall Street Journal reported on May 29th that China has rejected the US invitation for a bilateral meeting on defense in Singapore in May. This may result in US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin not meeting his Chinese counterpart, Li Shangfu, at the Shangri-La Dialogue from June 2nd to 4th, contradicting President Biden’s prediction at the G7 summit that China and the US will “start to thaw soon”.

The main concern about the meeting between Li Shangfu and Austin is the US sanctions on Li due to the purchase of Russian weapons during the Trump administration. China has reportedly told the US that the chance of a meeting between Li and Austin is slim unless the sanctions are lifted. Biden said at the G7 summit that he would discuss lifting the sanctions on Li Shangfu, but the US State Department has stated that they have no plans to lift the sanctions.

However, China has already resumed communication with the US at every level where there is no symbolic negative factor and there is a necessity. These meetings, including diplomatic department contacts, frank strategic dialogues between high-level officials of China and the US, and economic and trade sector communication, are all included and can be considered the high point of China-US contact this year.

The military gap is actually not difficult to understand. China’s sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as its increasing military support, are very clear, and the US has expanded the number of military bases available in the Philippines and signed defense cooperation agreements with Papua New Guinea this year, which is obviously to prepare for the possibility of military action against Taiwan and to strengthen military containment of China.